Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship

1974

The Characterization of a Vessel as a Common or
Private Carrier
Frank Chiang
Fordham University School of Law, fchiang@law.fordham.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Frank Chiang, The Characterization of a Vessel as a Common or Private Carrier, 48 Tulane L. Rev. 299 (1974)
Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/739

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

THE CHARACTERIZATION OF A VESSEL AS A
COMMON OR PRIVATE CARRIER
YUNG F. CHIANG*
INTRODUCTION

The characterization of a water carrier as either a 'common or a
private carrier involves the application of a common law doctrine'
which continues to be of significance today. Originally the common
law applied the term "carrier" solely to the counterpart of the
modern day "common carrier," while the term "bailee" was applied
2
to the counterpart of the modern day "private carrier." This common law distinction was relevant with respect to the nature of the
3
liability which might attach to the carrier for damage to cargo,
4
with respect to burdens of proof, and finally, with respect to liability for refusal to carry a shipper's goods. Thus, for example, a

common carrier was obliged to accept for carriage the goods of all
comers or incur liability for damages due to his refusal ;5 no such
obligation was placed upon a private carrier. Moreover, the characterization of a carrier as a common carrier or a private carrier is
significant today with respect to the applicability of the Federal
7
Bills of Lading Act (FBLA),6 the Harter Act, the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (Cogsa),8 and the Uniform Commercial Code
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. LL.B.
1958, Taiwan University; LL.M. 1962, Northwestern University; J.D. 1965,
University of Chicago.
I No such characterization exists in the civil law system.
2 See Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703); Morse v. Slue, 86
Eng. Rep. 159 (K.B. 1672).
3 See text at notes 11-14 infra.
4 See text at notes 22-23 infra.
5 See Varble v. Bigley, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 698 (1879).
6 The Federal Bills of Lading Act or the Pomerene Act applies only to
bills of lading issued by common carriers. Section 1 of the FBLA provides:
"[b]lls of lading issued by any common carrierfor the transportation of goods
in any territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or from
a place in a State to a place in a foreign country, or from a place in one State
to a place in another State, or from a place in one State to a place in the same
State through another State or foreign country, shall be governed by this
chapter." 49 U.S.C. § 81 (1970) (emphasis added).
The Uniform Bills of Lading Act also applies only to bills of lading issued
by common carriers. 46 U.S.C. § 190 (1970).
7 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-95 (1970). It is settled judicial interpretation that the
Harter Act applies only to freighters operating as common carriers, though
the Act does not explicitly provide so. For a discussion of the applicability of
the Harter Act generally, see Chiang, The Applicability of Cogsa and the
Harter Act to Water Bills of Lading, 14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 267 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Chiang].
8 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1970). The applicability of the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act depends, under certain circumstances, on the character of the
issuer of the bill of lading involved. For a general discussion of the applicability
of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, see Chiang, supra note 7.
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(UCC).9 Although the applicability of the provisions of these
statutes may be dependent upon the characterization of the carrier
as a common or private carrier, the statutes do not themselves define these terms. The statutes instead rely upon common law definitions as the basis for statutory interpretation.1 0 It is the purpose
9 Uniform Commercial Code §§ 7-101 et seq. (1972 version). Article Seven
on Documents of Title of the Uniform Commercial Code does not explicitly
provide that the article applies to bills of lading issued by private carriers.
Trousdale seems to regard it as inapplicable to private carriers when he says,
in The Uniform Commercial Code in Minnesota:Article 7-Warehouse Receipts
and Bills of Lading, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 463, 464 (1966): "[a]lthough the Code,
unlike the UBLA [Uniform Bills of Lading Act], does not explicitly state that
it governs bills of lading issued by all common carriers,it seems implicit in the
definition of 'bill of lading' as well as in article 7 when read as a whole."
(emphasis added). However, the proposition that Article Seven of the Uniform
Commercial Code applies to bills of lading issued by private carriers as well
as common carriers is supported by R. Braucher, Documents of Title 12 (2d
ed. 1958); Ruud, Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading, and Other Documents
of Title: Article VII, 16 Ark. L. Rev. 81, 83-84 (1961); Boshkoff, Documents
of Titles: A Comparison of the Uniform Commercial Code and Other Uniform
Acts, with Emphasis on Michigan Law, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 711, 716-17 (1961) ;
and Stroh, Article 7: Documents of Title, 30 Mo. L. Rev. 300, 301-02 (1965).
The latter view can find its support from the language of the Code itself.
UCC § 1-201(6) defines "bills of lading" as "a document evidencing the receipt
of goods for shipment issued by a person engaged in the business of trans" Thus, a logical and necessary conclusion
porting or forwarding goods....
under the view that the UCC applies only to bills of lading issued by common
carriers must be that all "[p]ersons engaged in the business of transporting
or forwarding goods" are common carriers. Such a drastic change in the
definition of a common carrier by the Code is unimaginable as will be seen from
subsequent discussion. Furthermore, the official comment to UCC § 1-201(6),
comment 6, definition of bills of lading, explicitly says "[tjhe definition has
been enlarged to include . . . bills issued by contract carriers as well as those
issued by common carriers." Finally, UCC § 7-301(2) provides:
When goods are loaded by an issuer who is a common carrier,the issuer
must count the packages of goods if package freight and ascertain the
kind and quantity if bulk freight. In such cases 'shipper's weight, load
and count' or other words indicating that the description was made by
the shipper are ineffective except as to freight concealed by packages.
(Emphasis added).
UCC § 7-301(3) provides:
When bulk freight is loaded by a shipper who makes available to the
issuer adequate facilities for weighing such freight, an issuer who is a
common carrier must ascertain the kind and quantity within a reasonable
time after receiving the written request of the shipper to do so. In
such cases 'shipper's weight' or other words of like purport are ineffective.
Thus the Code uses both the term "a carrier" and the term "an issuer who is
a common carrier" and imposes on the latter additional obligations contractual
in nature. Therefore, whenever the Code uses the term "a carrier" or "an
issuer," it must refer to any carrier or any issuer regardless of his character.
Clearly, without defining the term "common carrier," the Code makes a distinction between a carrier who is a common carrier and a carrier who is not.
10 A statute may incorporate the common law definition into its definition
of a common carrier. For instance, the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 902(d) (1970), defines a "common carrier" as:
any person which holds itself out to the general public to engage in the
transportationby water in interstate or foreign commerce of passengers
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of this article to investigate the common law definitions and analyze
their application to the four types of business operations in which
a carrier may be engaged.
BACKGROUND-COMMON LAW DEFINITIONS

The distinction made by the common law between a common
carrier and a private carrier results in differences in both the
substantive and procedural law applicable to each class of carrier.
Besides the distinction, noted above, by which a common carrier
alone may incur liability for refusing to carry goods, significant
differences exist with respect to the nature of the liability imposed
upon the carrier for damage to cargo, with respect to the freedom
to contract away liabilities, and also with respect to the burden
of proof required to establish carrier liability. Thus, so long as a
ship is seaworthy at the start of the voyage," a private carrier for
reward12 is responsible only for the loss or damage to the cargo
occurring during the voyage occasioned by the negligence of the
carrier or his employees. 13 Common carriers by water, on the other
or property or any class or classes thereof for compensation, except...
an express company... (emphasis added).
The term "any person which holds itself out to the general public to engage
in the transportation by water," which constitutes the substantive part of the
definition, is, as we shall see, of common law origin and may be interpreted
only in the light of the common law theory.
11 Pennewill v. Cullen, 5 Del. (Harr.) 238, 242 (1849) ; Collier v. Valentine,
11 Mo. 192 (1848).
12 A carrier without reward or hire is necessarily a private carrier and
therefore generally subjected to a lesser degree of liability. If a common carrier
in his ordinary course of business undertakes to carry certain goods without
reward, the carrier is subjected to this lesser degree of liability for the goods
so transported. For the liability of a carrier without reward, see R. Hutchinson, The Law of Carriers § 1, ch. 2 (2d ed. 1891).
'3 According to Holmes, originally all carriers bore the same liability,
namely strict liability, under the general law of bailment. 0. Holmes, The
Common Law 165-205 (1881) (especially 180 et seq.).
In the United States, the rule stated in the text has long been accepted by
the courts. See, e.g., The Neaffie, 17 F. Cas. 1260 (No. 10,063) (C.C.D. La.
1870); Pennewill v. Cullen, 5 Del. (Harr.) 238 (1849); Varble v. Bigley, 77
Ky. (14 Bush) 698 (1879); United States v. Power, 6 Mont. 271 (1887).
In England, the rule was once a subject of controversy. See Nugent v.
Smith, 1 C.P.D. 423 (1876) ; Liver Alkali Co. v. Johnson L.R. 9 Ex. 338 (1874).
In both cases, Judge Brett (later Lord Esher) held the view that private carriers, like common carriers, were subject to strict liability.
In Paterson Steamships v. Canadian Co-operative Wheat Producers, [1934]
A.C. 538, Lord Wright stated, "[it] will therefore be convenient here, in construing those portions of the [Canadian Water-Carriage of Goods Act, 1910,
as revised in 1927], which are relevant to this appeal, to state in very summary form the simplest principles which determine the obligations attaching
to a carrierof goods by sea or water. At common law, he was called an insurer,
that is he was absolutely responsible for delivering in like order and condition
at the destination the goods bailed to him for carriage. He could avoid liability
for loss or damage only by showing that the loss was due to the act of God or
the King's enemies.' Id. at 544-45 (emphasis added). Since the case was de-
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hand, bear not only the bailee's liability for negligence, but also the
strict liability of one engaged in a public employment. 14 This dual
liability of a common carrier which requires him to exercise ordinary care, in addition to bearing the burden of strict liability, is
important in at least two ways. First, the exceptions to strict liability, e.g., act of God, do not prevent recovery for loss occasioned
by such an exception if the loss could have been averted through the
exercise of ordinary care by the carrier. 5 Second, in instances in
which an exception clause is inserted in a bill of lading to except
specified risks from the strict liability of the common carrier, the
clause will be ineffective to relieve the carrier from liability if the
failure of the carrier to exercise ordinary care has contributed to
the loss.'6 Finally the point is helpful with respect to interpreting
Section 7-309(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code. The section
provides:
A carrier who issues a bill of lading whether negotiable or
non-negotiable must exercise the degree of care in relation
to the goods which a reasonably careful man would exercise
under like circumstances. This subsection does not repeal
or change any law or rule of law which imposes liability
upon a common carrier for damages not caused by its
negligence.
Moreover, under Section 1-102(3) of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the obligation to use reasonable care imposed by Section 7309 (1) may not be varied by agreement. Thus, where the Code is
applicable, while a common carrier still bears strict liability, his
cided under the provisions of the Act, rather than under the common law, and
the facts indicated that the vessel involved was a general vessel, the above
statement was merely dictum.
14 The strict liability of common carriers is recognized at common law both
in the United States and England. Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 7 (1858); United Fruit Co. v. New York & B. Transp. Co., 65 A. 415
(Md. 1906); Elliott v. Rossell, 10 Johns. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813); Joseph
Travers & Sons v. Cooper, [1915] 1 K.B. 73 (C.A. 1914); Cork Insulation &
Asbestos v. Mackintosh & Co. (Gibraltar), [1952] 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 197.
Therefore, they are responsible for all loss or damage to cargo unless occasioned by an Act of God, a public enemy, the law of the country, an act or
default of the shippers, the inherent nature of the cargo itself or its having
been properly made the subject of a general average sacrifice. See, e.g., Gulf
Coast Transp. Co. v. Howell, 70 So. 567 (Fla. 1915) (Act of God); Harris &
Son v. China Mutual Steam Navigation Co. (M. & C.L. Co.), [1959] 2 Lloyd's
List L. R. 500 (inherent defect of cargo).
15 Williams v. Grant, 1 Conn. 487 (1816); Bowman v. Teall, 23 Wend. 306
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840).
16 See, e.g., Austin Nichols & Co. v. Compania Transatlantica, 219 N.Y.S.
86 (App. Div. 1926); Whitesides v. Russell, 8 W. & S. 44 (Pa. 1844); Joseph
Travers & Sons v. Cooper, [1915] 1 K.B. 73 (C.A. 1914); Price & Co. v. Union
Lighterage Co., [1904] 1 K.B. 412 (C.A.); Notara v. Henderson, L.R. 7 Q.B.
225 (1872).
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common law freedom to contract out his negligence liability where
recognized, e.g., New York, is restricted.
The common law upholds the principle of freedom of contract,
and therefore the liability of carriers may be altered by an express
agreement or exception clauses inserted by shipowners in bills of
lading.17 However, while a private carrier may contract out the
liability from his own negligence and that of his servant,"" a common carrier cannot do so, 19 except in England and the State of New
York,20 on the ground of public policy.
The common law characterization is also important with respect
to the burden of proof. While a presumption of unseaworthiness or
of negligence arises from loss or damage to goods entrusted to a
common carrier, 21 no such presumption exists in the case of private
22
carriers.
137Deviation by the vessel, however, has the effect of displacing the express
contract contained in the bill of lading, and the shipowner's responsibility
either as a common carrier or private carrier is, in such an instance, to be
determined by the common law. The Poznan, 276 F. 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1921);
Joseph Thorley Ltd. v. Orchis S.S. Co., [1907] 1 K.B. 660.
18 See J. Story, Commentaries on the Law of Bailnents §§ 32-33 (5th ed.
1851) [hereinafter cited as Story, On Bailments].
10 Federal courts and most state courts have held that a common carrier
may not contract out the liability from its own negligence or that of its servants. Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955); Oceanic Steam
Nay. Co. v. Corcoran, 9 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1925); Macomber & Whyte Rope Co.
v. United Fruit Co., 225 Ill. App. 286 (1922). This is true even if a negligence
clause was permissible under the law of the state of issuance of the bill of lading. Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397
(1889). It was held in dictum that the Harter Act did not change this common
law rule except to the extent expressly covered by the Act. Feldman v. Old
Dominion S.S. Co., 176 N.Y.S. 183, 188 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
20 Rubens v. Ludgate Hill S.S. Co., 20 N.Y.S. 481 (Sup. Ct. 1892); Marriott v. Yeoward Bros., [1909] 2 K.B. 987; The Duero, L.R. 2 Adm. & Eccl.
393 (1869); Briscoe v. Powell, 22 T.L.R. 128 (1905). This writer was not able
to find any other state which held the same view as New York on this point.
21 The Fohnina, 212 U.S. 354 (1909); The Wildcroft, 201 U.S. 378 (1906);
Hermen v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 F. 859 (2d Cir. 1917).
See also Schnell v. The Vallescura, 293 U.S. 296 (1934); United States v.
Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 285 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1960); The O.Y.
Tonnage, A.B. v. Texas Co., 296 F. 893 (5th Cir. 1924); The Rosalia, 264
F. 285 (2d Cir. 1920).
22 Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 114 F.2d
248 (2d Cir. 1940); The G.R. Crowe, 294 F. 506 (2d Cir. 1923); The C.R.
Scheffer, 249 F. 600 (2d Cir. 1918) ; The Wildenfels, 161 F. 864 (2d Cir. 1908) ;
The Commerce, 46 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), aff'd sub nom. New England
S.S. Co. v. Howard, 130 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1942).
The rule on the burden of proof may be affected by the enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code when applicable. While the Uniform Bills of Lading
Act does not set forth a rule on the burden of proof, the Uniform Commercial
Code does so and places it upon the carrier (in both classes). The Code, however, also provides an option under which holders of a bill of lading may bear
the burden.
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Chief Justice Holt,in explaining the imposition of strict liability
on common carriers, stated:
The law charges this person thus intrusted to carry goods,
against all events but acts of God, and of the enemies of the
King. For though the force be never so great, .asif an irresistible multitude of people should rob him, nevertheless he
is chargeable. And this is a politick [sic] establishment, contrived by the policy of the law, for the safety of all persons,
the necessity of whose affairs oblige them to trust these sorts
of persons, that they may be safe in their ways of dealing;
for else these carriers might have an opportunity of undoing
all persons that had any dealings with them, by combining
with thieves, &c. and yet doing it in such a clandestine manner, as would not be possible to be discovered. And
this is
23
the reason the law is founded upon in that point.
The earliest case to define the term "common carrier by water"
is Coggs v. Bernard.2 In that case, a common carrier was defined
by Justice Holt simply as one who exercises a public employment.
In his treatise on the law of bailments, Story, in agreement with
Holt, defined a common carrier as "one who undertakes for hire
or reward to transport the goods of such as choose to employ him
from place to place. '25 "To bring a person within the description
of a common carrier," Story added, "he must exercise it as a public
UCC § 7-403(1) provides in part: "The bailee must deliver the goods to a
person entitled under the document who complies with subsections (2) and (3),
unless and to the extent that the bailee establishes any of the following:
(b) Damage to or delay, loss or destruction of the goods for which the bailee
is not liable [, but the burden of establishing negligence in such causes is
on the person entitled under the document]."

A survey discloses that thirty-nine Code jurisdictions have not adopted the
optional language of the Code, and therefore the carrier bears the burden of
proof. They are: Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin. (In California and Texas, however, the optional language has been adopted
only "in case of damage or destruction by fire"). In these jurisdictions, the
rule of burden of proof under the Code, when applicable, will change the
common law with respect to private carriers.
The optional language of the Code, placing the burden of proof on the
holder of the bills of lading, has been adopted by twelve states. They are:
Arizona, Arkansas, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Nevada, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Wyoming. (Arizona and Arkansas have
adopted the optional language with minor modification, which has not changed
the substantive rule). In these jurisdictions, the rule of burden of proof under
the Code, when applicable, will change the common law with respect to common carriers.
23 Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 112 (K.B. 1672).
24 Id.
25 Story, On Baihments, supra note 18, § 495.
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employment, he must undertake to carry goods for persons generally, and he must hold himself out as ready to engage in the
transportation of goods for hire as a business, not as a casual
occupation pro hac vice."' 20 Holt's definition given in Coggs v.
Bernard was also accepted by Kent in his Commentaries, 27 and by
the Supreme Court of the United States in The Propeller Niagara
2
v.Cordes. 8
However, the definition set forth in Coggs v. Bernard has not
been accepted without qualification. In Brind v. Dale,29 another
element was added to the definition. The defendant owned thirty
or forty carts which were kept standing near the wharfs, ready
to be hired by any person who chose to engage them either by the
hour, day or job. When a package, delivered for transportation
from one wharf to another wharf in the same port, was found to
be missing, the defendant was sued for the loss. Lord Abinger
held that the defendant was not a common carrier, agreeing with
the defendant's argument that "a common carrier is one who for
hire and reward takes goods from town to town,"3 0 and the defendant did not carry goods "from town to town," but only within the
port. Under this definition a common carrier by water is a carrier
who engages in transportation from port to port and not merely
between two points in the same port. Parsons defined a common
carrier as "one who offers to carry goods for any person, [either]
between certain termini, or on a certain route."' This view has
been followed by some courts, 82 and conflicts with the Brind v. Dale
26 Id.
27 "Common carriers undertake generally, and not as a casual occupation,
and for all people indifferently to convey goods, and deliver them at a place
appointed, for hire as a business, and with or without a special agreement as
to price." 2 J.Kent, Commentaries on American Law *598 (footnotes omitted).
28 62 U.S. (21 How.) 7 (1858).
29 173 Eng. Rep. 463 (Ex. 1837).
30 Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
31 1 T. Parsons, A Treatise on the Law of Shipping and Admiralty 245
(1869). See also T. Parsons, Laws of Business 259 (1909). But of. T. Parsons
on Contracts, Book III, Ch. XI, Section VI (1860). For a comment on Parsons'
view, see R. Hutchinson, The Law of Carriers 72 n.64 (3d ed. 1906).
32 In The Neaffie, 17 F. Cas. 1260 (No. 10,063) (C.C.D. La. 1870), the court,
in holding a steam-tug towing flats and other water craft from one point to
another in and about a harbor not a common carrier, stated: "A common carrier is often defined to be: 'One who undertakes for hire to transport the goods
of such as choose to employ him from point to point.' This definition is very
broad, and in its application to facts is subject to certain limitations. A better
and more precise definition is, 'One who offers to carry goods for any person
between certain termini or on a certain route, and who is bound to carry for
all who tender him goods and the price of carriage.'" Id. at 1261. In Varble v.
Bigley, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 698 (1879), holding that the towboat involved was
not a common carrier, the Kentucky Court of Appeals gave as a justification,
among others, that "[the carriers] are not shown to have operated on a definite
route or between established termini." Id. at 706-07.
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rule when the established route followed or the established termini
are within a single port. The character of a carrier is not determined by what the carrier styles himself nor by how the contract
of carriage designates him, but is determined by the way the vessel
33
is operated.
CHARACTERIZATION OF WATER CARRIERS BASED UPON THE

MANNER IN WHICH THE VESSEL IS OPERATED
A cargo shipowner generally engages in one of four types of
business operation.84 In the first, known as demising, the shipowner
simply leases or "demises" his vessel to another person for the
latter's use. In the second type of operation, the shipowner operates
a general vessel, holding himself out in his course of business as
willing to carry goods for all comers. In the third type of business
operation, under a charter contract, the shipowner solicits offers
to purchase the entire cargo space of a specified vessel. In the
fourth type of operation, the lighterage operation, the shipowner
solicits others to hire him to carry goods without specifying a particular vessel to be used.
A.

Vessels Under Demise Charter

During the nineteenth century, the terms "time charter party"
and "contract of hire" were used to designate demise charter contracts. 5 Operation under demise charter was common during the
nineteenth century but is less so today. The contract between the
shipowner and the lessee in this type of operation is a contract of
hire as distinguished from a contract of affreightment, and is
called a demise or bareboat charter. Absent designation as such,
a demise charter contract may be implied from the content of the
contract. 36
Under a demise charter, the possession and complete control of
the vessel is transferred from the shipowner to the charterer. 7 The
charterer employs his own servants and crew on the vessel or, in
case of a barge without power, supplies the tug. Occasionally the
83 See Jefferson Chemical Co. v. M/T Grena, 413 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1969).

34 See generally for a discussion of the shipping business and general ship-

ping practice, T. Scrutton, Charterparties and Bills of Lading, arts. 1 and 2
(17th ed. 1964).
85 In modern times, the term "time charterparty" is used to refer to a type
of contract made under the third type of operation to be discussed later. See
Sea & Land Sec., Ltd. v. William Dickinson & Co., [1942] 2 K.B. 65, 72 Lloyd's
List L.R. 159.
36 Colvin v. Newberry, 6 Eng. Rep. 923 (Ex. 1832).
37 The Doyle, 105 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1939) ; R. D. Wood Co. v. Phoenix Steel
Corp., 211 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Sea & Land Sec., Ltd. v. William
Dickinson & Co., [1942] 2 K.B. 65, 72 Lloyd's List L.R. 159.
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charterer employs as his own agents the master and crew originally
employed by the shipowner. In demising a vessel, the shipowner
does not engage in the business of transporting or forwarding
goods. The shipowner does not receive goods for transportation and
does not issue bills of lading. Therefore, the contract is not a contract of carriage at all. The shipowner is not a carrier, much less
a common carrier, and is not personally responsible for goods lost
or damaged while under the control of the charterer. 38 On the other
hand, the charterer has a special property interest in the vessel,
such as a right to collect the freight from shippers.3 9 As against
a third person, a demise charterer is, in the words of Lord Tenderden, the owner pro tempore,40 or, in the words of Kent, the owner
pro hac vice of the vessel.4 1 The charterer may operate the vessel
within the terms of the charter party in any way he wishes. If the
charterer engages in one of the remaining types of operation, to
be discussed below, his status as a common carrier or private carrier is the same as that of a shipowner engaged in the same type
of operation. In fact, federal law expressly applies the 42limitations
of a vessel owner's liability to such a demise charterer.
B.

General Vessels
A shipowner operating his ship as a general vessel holds himself
out in the course of business as willing to carry goods for all comers.
He contracts with numerous shippers separately and carries their
goods in a single vessel. The contracts so negotiated are contracts
of carriage and are referred to as contracts of affreightment. 43 The
fact that the vessel carries the goods of all comers results in a
characterization of the vessel as a general vessel and the cargoes
carried as general cargoes.
In early days, the designation "tramp"44 was applied to general
3s Thompson v. Snow, 4 Me. (Greeni.) 264 (1826); Tuckerman v. Brown,
17 Barb. 191 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853); Colvin v. Newberry, 6 Eng. Rep. 923 (Ex.
1832); The Baumwoll v. Furness, [1893] A.C. 8. The vessel itself, however,
can be libeled.
39 Clendaniel v. Tuckerman, 17 Barb. 184 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853).
40 Colvin v. Newberry, 6 Eng. Rep. 923 (Ex.1832).
41 3 J.Kent, Commentaries on American Law *133-39.
42 46 U.S.C. § 186 (1970) provides:
The charterer of any vessel, in case he shall man, victual, and navigate
such vessel at his own expense, or by his own procurement, shall be
deemed the owner of such vessel within the meaning of the provisions of
this chapter [containing the Shipowner's Limited Liability set and the
Harter Act] relating to the limitation of the liability of the owners of
vessels; and such vessel, when so chartered, shall be liable in the same
manner as if navigated by the owner thereof.
43 The other type of contract of carriage is passenger carriage.
44 "A tramp steamer is one which sails here and there, picklng up business
on its course ...." E. Stevens, Shipping Practice 1 (8th ed. 1962). For a general discussion see C. McDowell & H. Gibbs, Ocean Transportation 43 et seq.
(1954) [hereinafter cited as McDowell & Gibbs].
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vessels which were not operated under any schedule as to time and
place but on an ad hoe basis at the time of the offering. Even today,
where the business in a port does not warrant a scheduled call, this
type of operation is usually employed. The service is offered to any
person who calls. The shipowner who operates a tramp is a common
carrier under the definitions of both Story and Lord Abinger since
under these definitions, neither an established termini nor an estab45
lished route is an essential characteristic of a common carrier.
However, under Parsons' definition which requires a definite
termini or route,46 the shipowner operating a tramp would not be
a common carrier. Nevertheless, courts have generally held the
owner of a tramp to be a common carrier, whether the vessel plies
between two ports on a river,47 on the Great Lakes,4 or along the
coast. 4 9 The only case to express a different view was Aymar &
Aymar v. Astor,5 o where a seagoing ship voyaged from New Orleans
to New York. The court there held that the master of a vessel at sea
was not a common carrier. This decision was criticized in McArthur
& Hurlbert v. Sears,5 1 where the owner of a general ship, sailing
from Buffalo, New York, to Detroit, Michigan, was held to be a
52
common carrier. More recently, in Morrisey v. S.S. R. & J.Faith,
a federal district court dismissed a contention by the owner of a
tramp that he was not a common carrier. The court remarked:
It cannot be questioned that the ship was engaged in commercial navigation-internal, coastal and foreign-and that
the ship through her owners regularly solicited the business
of the general public. It is this continuing contact with the
public, and the consequent necessity to insure full candor
and total fairness in such dealings, which distinguishes the
common carrier from the private carrier
and imposes added
53
obligations upon the common carrier.
The most common type of general vessel operation today is berth
or packet liner service, 54 either on oceans or on inland waterways.
See text at notes 23-24 supra.
See text at notes 31-32 supra.
Sewall v. Allen, 6 Wend. 335 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1830); Proprietors of the
Trent Navigation v. Ward, 170 Eng. Rep. 562 (K.B. 1785); Rich v. Kneeland,
79 Eng. Rep. 282 (K.B. 1613).
48 The Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 7 (1858); McArthur
& Hurlbert v. Sears, 21 Wend. 190 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839).
49 Nicholls & More, 82 Eng. Rep. 954 (1661).
50 6 Cow. 266 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826).
51 21 Wend. 190 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839).
52 252 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ohio 1965). Although the facts did not explicitly
state, there were indications that the oceangoing ship involved was not a liner
or a ship of a line.
53 Id. at 57.
54 According to Helen M. Gibbs, the term "berth service" is used in the
United States and "liner service" is used in Great Britain. McDowell & Gibbs,
supra note 44, at 47.
45
46
47
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In berth or liner service, a vessel transports its cargo regularly
under time tables, on scheduled routes, between designated ports. 55
In this type of operation bills of lading are usually issued to the
shippers upon receipt of goods for carriage, with the possible exception of any baggage carried aboard by the passengers themselves. Since these liners have definite termini they are common
carriers under the definitions of Story, Lord Abinger and Parsons.
When a general vessel plies within or between common law
countries, the only problem in characterizing the vessel under the
common law definitions relates to the existence of definite termini,
as discussed above. However, when part of a voyage is outside of
the common law jurisdiction, e.g., when the vessel sails from or to
a country whose jurisprudence is not based on the English common
law, and whose law does not classify a vessel as a common or
private carrier, additional questions may be raised, including what
law determines the character of the carrier and whether the character of the carrier remains the same during the entire voyage.5 6 In
the early case of Morse v. Slue,57 the English court appears to have
held that the carrier was strictly liable as a common carrier under
English law because the loss of the goods carried on the seagoing
ship occurred within the jurisdiction.In that case, a shipper sought
to recover for the theft of goods delivered in London for shipment
to Spain 8 but stolen while the ship was still on the Thames. The
court of King's Bench held that "the master [and owner of the
ship] is liable so long as he is within the Kings [sic] protection, and
by our law being within the body of the county, wages beginning
here ....,"59 Thus the court apparently held the master of the ship
liable because he had a remedy against the thief since the robbery
occurred within the realm.6 0
65 A case reported as early as 1813 involved a vessel operated in a manner
which can best be described as semiliner service. In Elliott v. Rossell, the
owners of three vessels operated them between three Lake Ontario ports and
Montreal. It was stated: "[t]he vessels will depart, on an average of one a
fortnight from Oswego, Sodus and Genesee river. They will also go to Queenstown, and the head of Lake Ontaiio, as required.... ." 10 Johns. 1 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1813). For a general discussion of a liner operation see E. Stevens, Shipping Practice (8th ed. 1962).
56 In no other legal system, including the civil law, is the distinction between common carrier and private carrier concerning their liabilities made.
For instance, Article 103 of the French Commercial Code provides, "The carrier guarantees against the loss of goods carried except due to superior force.
He guarantees against any damage other than that originated from the inherent nature of the goods and from superior force . . ." (writer's translation). A carrier in civil law jurisdictions is not liable for goods lost in robbery.
See 2 J.Kent, Commentaries on American Law *598.
57 86 Eng. Rep. 159 (K.B. 1672).
58 Where vessels were not classified as common or private carriers.
59 Mors and Slew, 84 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1672).
60 See Southcot v. Bennet, 78 Eng. Rep. 1041 (Q.B. 1601). For a general
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Kent, however, saw the ground of the decision in Morse v. Slue
differently. Commenting on that case in Elliott v. Rossell, he said:
Though the goods were lost by robbery on board the vessel
in the river Thames, before the voyage had commenced, yet
the court did not proceed on the ground that the master was
responsible under one law, in port, and another, at sea ....
If the master be chargeable as a common carrier, for goods
received to be transported beyond sea, it would seem to be
very extraordinary and idle for the law to regard him in
that character only from the time that the goods were received on board, until he had put to sea, and to regard him
when coming from abroad, as common carrier only from the
time that he entered within the jurisdiction of the port.
There is no colour of such a limitation of the rule. The character, duty and responsibility of a carrier continue to attach
to the master, as long as he has charge of the goods....
In short, it must be regarded as a settled point in the English
law, that masters and owners of vessels are liable in port,
and at sea, and abroad, to the whole extent of inland carriers, except so far as they are exempted by the exceptions
in the contract of charter-party, or bill of lading, or by

statute ....

61

Kent concluded: "[t]he courts in this country have always considered masters of vessels liable as common carriers, in respect to
foreign as well as internal voyages.16 2 Elliott v. Rossell involved a
vessel sailing from ports on Lake Ontario to Montreal. The vessel
in question struck a rock about a mile from Montreal and the goods
on board were lost. The court, affirming the judgment below, held
that the carrier was a common carrier and bore strict liability
even though the goods were lost in a foreign jurisdiction.
Crosby v. Grinne163 cited Elliott v. Rossell in holding the master of a vessel liable as a common carrier for moisture damage
which occurred to hides during the voyage. The court remarked:
"[t]he notion that the common-law doctrine [that a common carrier bears strict liability] is founded upon the custom of the realm,
and has no operation out of the realm, is not supported by the
English authorities, and is nowhere sanctioned by the decisions of
the courts in the United States.... On the contrary, it is directly
repudiated in this state." 64 The reasoning of Crosby v. Grinnell,
however, can hardly be praised. The vessel there involved had sailed
from Rio de Janeiro to New York. The federal court applied the law
discussion see 0. Holmes, The Common Law 164-205 (1881), particularly at
178-82.
61 Elliott v. Rossell, 10 Johns. 1, 8-9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813).
62 Id. at 9.
68 6 F. Cas. 877 (No. 3422) (S.D.N.Y. 1851).
64 Id. at 878.
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of New York in determining the character of the carrier. The court
reasoned:
This engagement being entered into, to be performed in
New York, it is, as to its nature, obligation and interpretation, to be governed by the law of the place of performance.
Story, Confl. Laws (3d Ed.) § 280; 2 Kent, Comm. (6th
Ed.) 459, note 6. If the contract is not to be construed as
rendering the master an insurer for the safe delivery of
this cargo by express agreement, it manifestly in no way
curtails his obligation as a common carrier under the law
of this state.6 5
However, in the reference cited by the court, Story stated "[w] here
the contract is, either expressly or tacitly, to be performed in any
other place, there the general rule is, in conformity to the presumed
intention of the parties, that the contract, as to its validity, nature,
obligation, and interpretation is to be governed by the law of the
place of performance."' 6 Kent's comment is substantially the
same. 67 The error of the court is not in citing the rule mentioned
by Story, but in the application of the rule. The goods were to be
discharged and delivered in New York, but discharge and delivery
was only a small portion of the performance of the contract of
carriage. Under the rule, the question of proper delivery as well
as that of misdelivery is governed by the law of the place of
delivery ;6 but the same should not apply to the question of whether
a carrier has properly carried out his general obligation, e.g.,
65 Id. at 879.

66 J. Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws 432 (3d ed. 1846) (footnotes omitted).
67 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law *459.
68 Bank of Calif. v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 64 F.2d 97 (2d
Cir. 1933). In this case, a shipper brought an action for misdelivery at the port
of destination against a common carrier to which goods were delivered for
transportation from Seattle to Hamburg, Germany via New York. The carrier
had issued a land bill of lading, into which the terms of water bills of lading of
the same company were effectively incorporated. Under the terms of the water
bills of lading, all claims for short delivery, loss or damage, had to be made in
writing to the carrier's agent at the port of destination within five days after
the steamer or lighter finished discharging. The shipper did not make claim until ten months after the arrival of the goods. Holding for the carrier, the court
concluded that the notice of claim and limitation of liability clauses in the bill
of lading were in full effect. Since, the court reasoned, the misdelivery of the
goods creating the claim was in Germany, whether the claim was lost by the
failure to give notice as required by the bill of lading was to be determined by
the German law. The shipper had offered no evidence to prove that under the
German law a misdelivery excused the giving of notice of claim or the performance of any of the other terms of the bill of lading. The court added,
"[q]uestions of interpretation or initial validity of the terms of the bill of
lading are governed by the law of the place where the bill of lading is issued,
but questions relating to the performance or breach and its effect are governed
by the law of the place of performance." Id. at 98.
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proper stowage and due care during the voyage, which is different
from the question of proper delivery.
While the court in Crosby v. Grinnell expressly stated the conflict rule applicable to characterization of the carrier involved,
courts failed to do so in Elliott v. Rossell and Morse v. Slue. The
vessels involved in the latter cases had sailed, or were to sail, from
the jurisdiction. While in Elliott v. Rossell the court stated, and in
Morse v. Slue the court was regarded by Kent 69 as having said,
that the character of the vessel remained the same after it sailed
outside the jurisdiction, both courts applied the law of the jurisdiction to determine the character of the vessel. The courts did not,
however, state the conflict rule upon which the application of the
common law was based. It is surprising that no other case could
be found in which the question was raised as to which law determines the character of the carrier. 70 Based upon these cases a
limited observation can be made: a vessel, whether departing as in
Morse v. Slue or arriving as in Crosby v. Grinnell,will be characterized by a common law court according to the common law. 71
As long as a vessel operates as a general ship, the type or the
structure of the vessel is irrelevant to the characterization of the
vessel as a common or private carrier. Thus, if a barge owner offers
to use his barge for general carriage, he is a common carrier. The
same is true with respect to container ships which operate or offer
to operate as general vessels.
In most water transportation, and almost without exception in
foreign commerce, transactions are not concluded directly between
shipowners and shippers, but are accomplished through one or two
intermediary parties. These intermediaries are freight forwarders
and freight brokers. A definition of a freight broker which is of
general validity is given by the Federal Maritime Commission:
"any person who is engaged by a carrier to sell or offer for sale
transportation, and who holds himself out by solicitation or advertisement as one who negotiates between shipper and carrier
for the purchase, sale, conditions and terms of transportation."7 2
When a shipowner offers his vessels in berth or liner service, a
freight broker is usually retained by the shipowner to sell or offer
for sale the water transportation services involved. Upon the application for a freight contract by a shipper or his agent, the
freight broker will, on behalf of the shipowner, accept a contract
and book the engagement. The freight brokers are not carriers
69 See text at note 60 supra.

70 The flag of a vessel has been totally ignored.

71 See also Morris v. Lamport & Holt, Ltd., 54 F.2d 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
72 46 C.F.R. § 510.21(f) (1971).
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and are never considered by courts to be so. They are not "issuers"
of the bills of lading which they sign. They act merely as agents
and the liner owners alone are the issuers of the bills of lading.73
When shipping goods, most shippers ship their goods through
the service of a freight forwarder or forwarding agent.74 The
freight forwarder or forwarding agent here discussed is an independent forwarder, that is, a person who is neither under the control
of one or more shipowners pursuant to a continuing contract nor
affiliated with a shipowner in a corporate sense. The freight forwarder's principal business is to handle the shipment of the goods
of others.7 5 There are two distinctive functions which a freight
forwarder may choose to perform in handling a particular shipment. A consolidating forwarder may assume, in the case of a
small shipment, the responsibility of transporting the goods and
assembling the shipment with similar small shipments from numerous other shippers into a consolidated shipment.7 6 Such business
practice is reported as early as 1839 in New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank.7 7 There a person contracted with
a steamship company for a space for "a wooden crate, of the dimensions of five feet by five feet in width and height, and six feet
in length (contents unknown),"78 and then solicited goods from the
public to be transported to points where the steamboat company
sent their boats. Those "freight forwarders" subject to the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Act are consolidating forwarders.7 9 Sometimes the term "domestic freight forwarder" is
73 UCC § 7-102 (1) (g) provides:
Issuer means a bailee who issues a document except that in relation to
an unaccepted delivery order it means the person who orders the possessor of goods to deliver. Issuer includes any person for whom an agent
or employee purports to act in issuing a document if the agent or employee has real or apparent authority to issue documents, notwithstanding that the issuer received no goods or that the goods were misdescribed
or that in any other respect the agent or employee violated his instructions.
74 English shipping practice and courts use the term "forwarding agent"
rather than freight forwarder. See Heskell v. Continental Express, Ltd., [1950]
1 All E.R. 1033, 83 Lloyd's List L.R. 438 (K.B.).
75 For other functions, see Port of New York Freight Forwarder Investigation, 3 U.S. Maritime Comm'n Reports 157 (1949). For a general discussion
see McDowell & Gibbs, supra note 44, at 146.
76 For the business practice of these freight forwarders, see Comment,
Intermodal Transportationand the FreightForwarder,76 Yale L.J. 1360, 1362
(1967).
77 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344 (1848).
78 Id.
79 Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1002 (1970) provides:
(a) For the purpose of this chapter(5) The term 'freight forwarder' means any person which (otherwise than as a carrier subject to chapters 1, 8, or 12 of this
title) holds itself out to the general public as a common carrier
to transport or provide transportation of property, or any class
or classes of property, for compensation, in interstate com-
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used to refer to a consolidating forwarder. While it is tiue that the
majority of freight forwarders who handle domestic shipments
conduct their business as consolidating forwarders, the term is not
limited to domestic shipping; some consolidating forwarders do
handle overseas shipping as well.80 A freight forwarder may, on the
other hand, function merely as a dispatcher.81 In this case his sole
engagement is to arrange with a shipowner or the shipowner's
agent for the shipment of the shipper's goods. The dispatching
freight forwarder 82 assumes no responsibility for the transportation of the goods; the contract is essentially a contract of service
and not of carriage. The "independent ocean freight forwarders,"
83
who are subject to the regulations of the Federal Shipping Act,
are such freight forwarders.
A consolidating forwarder is not an agent of the shipper who
engages him to forward goods, but an independent contractor. The
contract with the shipper is essentially a contract of carriage,
and the consolidating forwarder is sometimes called an "overriding" carrier," or nonvessel operating (common) carrier. 85 As such,
the consolidating forwarder may be contrasted to the "underlying"
carrier, the vessel owner, to whom the overriding carrier delivers
the consolidated goods for shipment. A consolidating forwarder,
and he alone, is responsible for the bills of lading he issues, and
courts have held him to be a common carrier at common law. Thus
merce, and which, in the ordinary and usual course of its undertaking, (A) assembles and consolidates or provides for
assembling and consolidating shipments of such property, and
performs or provides for the performance of break-bulk and
distributing operations with respect to such consolidated shipments, and (B) assumes responsibility for the transportation
of such property from point of receipt to point of destination,
and (C) utilizes, for the whole or any part of the transportation of such shipments, the services of a carrier and carriers
subject to chapters 1, 8, or 12 of this title.
80 See Port of New York Freight Forwarder Investigation, 3 U.S. Maritime Comm'n Reports 157, 161 (1949).
81 For general discussion see Heskell v. Continental Express, Ltd., [1950]
1 All E.R. 1033, 83 Lloyd's List L.R. 438 (K.B.).
82 The terms "foreign freight forwarder" or "ocean freight forwarder" are
sometimes used to refer to freight forwarders who perform merely dispatching
functions. These terms, however, may be misleading especially when used out
of context. For example, a foreign freight forwarder, literally one who handles
import or export shipments, sometimes conducts his business as a consolidating
forwarder. For this reason, hereinafter, freight forwarders who conduct their
business in the above described manner shall be termed "dispatching freight
forwarders."
83 Federal Shipping Act § 1, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (1970).
84 An overriding carrier is defined to be "a carrier which employs the facilities and vehicles of other carriers in the transportation it performs." Ahearn,
Freight Forwarders and Commo= Carriage, 15 Fordham L. Rev. 248, 249
(1946).
85 See 46 C.F.R. § 510.21(d) (1971).
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in Fairchildv. Slocum,8 6 the defendants, members of an association,
had represented themselves to the public as a transportation company doing business between New York and Ogdensburgh under
the business name of the association. The association itself did
not own vessels, but each individual defendant owned, with one
or more other defendants, vessels plying part of the waterway
between Albany and Ogdensburgh. The plaintiff, through an agent,
entered into a contract with an agent of the association for the
transportation of a quantity of merchandise from the City of New
York to Ogdensburgh on the St. Lawrence River. The bill of lading
issued by the association contained a clause excepting the dangers
of Lake Ontario. From New York to Albany, the goods were carried
by a line of towboats owned by others not a party to the action.
The association paid the freight to the owners of the tow-boats.
The schooner, on which the goods were transshipped at Oswego,
sailed from Oswego to Ogdensburgh, and capsized in a sudden
squall. Much of the cargo was lost or damaged. The defendants
contended that since they, as an association, neither had an interest in the towboats which carried the goods from New York to
Albany, nor jointly had an interest in the vessels employed on the
voyage from Albany to Ogdensburgh, they were not carriers and
therefore, not liable for loss or damage occasioned by the danger
of navigation. The Supreme Court of New York, rejecting this
argument, held that the defendants, jointly, were carriers. The
court reasoned:
It is a matter of no moment that the defendants were not
interested in the tow-boats by which the goods were forwarded
from New York to Albany; nor is it material as to the result
of this case, that they had no joint interest in the vessels
employed on [the other part of the voyage]. They were engaged in the business of carriers, and whether they used
their own boats and vessels, or employed the vessels of other
persons to carry for them on some part 8 7or even all of the
route, can be a matter of no consequence.
The court concluded that the defendants were liable not because
the loss or damage was occasioned by the danger of navigation, for
such liability was excepted, but because the negligence of their
employees had contributed to the loss. Implied in the conclusion is
that, but for the exception clause, the defendants would have been
liable for the loss occasioned by the danger of navigation, even if
no negligence of their employees contributed to such loss. As only
common carriers bear such liability, the court clearly regarded the
defendants as common carriers. Subsequently, another New York
86 19 Wend. 329 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
87

Id. at 332. See also Elof Hansson Agency, Ltd. v. Victoria Motor Haulage

Co., [1938] 43 Com. Cas. 260.
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court in Slutzkin v. Gerhard & Hey, Inc., 88 held that the Uniform
Bills of Lading Act and the Federal Bill of Lading Act applied,
and the liability of a common carrier attached to a consolidating
forwarder.8 9 The court found that although the defendant called
himself a forwarder, he was so conducting his business as to lead
the public to believe that he was a carrier and was employed as
such to ship goods without any knowledge of his true character on
the part of the shipper.
Generally, a dispatching freight forwarder does not issue his
own bills of lading. He is not a carrier, but merely an agent of
shippers notwithstanding the fact that he receives a commission
from shipowners.9 0 The dispatching freight forwarder's responsibility ceases when his service is rendered. He assumes no responsibility for the transportation and delivery of goods. The shipowner
alone is the carrier and the issuer of the bills of lading.
Whether a freight forwarder is acting as an agent of the
shipper, and therefore a dispatching forwarder, or as an independent contractor, and therefore a consolidating forwarder, is a
question of fact. The issuance of bills of lading to the shippers
generally indicates that the forwarder is a consolidating forwarder
and has undertaken to carry the goods. In exceptional cases, however, despite the issuance of a bill of lading by a freight forwarder,
the freight forwarder may have only assumed the responsibility
of dispatching the goods. In J.C. Penney Co. v. American Express
Co.,91 American Express was employed by a buyer to arrange the
transportation by water carrier of fabric which was purchased in
Italy for export to the United States. On the arrival of the ship, the
cases of fabric were found to have been damaged by sea water. The
buyer brought an action against both the ship company and American Express to recover damages. The court found the ship company liable for damage, but the court held American Express did
not act as a carrier even though the plaintiff alleged that by issuing
the through bill of lading, it became a carrier and bore liability as
such. The court said:
[The] Express Company was.., the agent of [the buyer]
on this ... shipment.

That this was the understanding of the parties is shown
by the correspondence between them, 92 especially in view of
88 191 N.Y.S. 104 (App. Div. 1921).

89 Both of these acts apply only to bills of lading issued by common carriers.
90 For a discussion of dispatching freight forwarder's commission see M.
Rosenthal, Techniques of International Trade 116, 120 (1950).
91 102 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), af'd, 201 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1953).
92

In the buyer's letter notifying the express company that it had had the
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the fact that the express company had functioned as [the
buyer's] agent for many shipments in the past.93
The court added that the existence of the agency relationship was
clear from the express company's bill of lading which contained the
stipulation,
[The express company's undertaking is] 'to act as shipping
agent for the shipper, and as such to make arrangements
for the transportation ... to be designated by the shipper
or in default of such designation to be selected by the company for and on behalf of the shipper, owner, consignee or
holder of this document.'"
On the other hand, the circumstances at the time of contracting
may be such that a contract of carriage by a freight forwarder is
implied even though a bill of lading is issued by the ship company.
The defendants in Landauer& Co. v. Smits & Co.95 carried on business, among other things, as a forwarding agent. The defendants
orally agreed with a shipper to arrange for carriage of the shipper's
goods from London to Antwerp. The defendants' representative
loaded the goods onto a ship which, although owned by another
company, was run in the defendants' lines and controlled by the
defendants. The defendants, in addition, were large shareholders
of, and in fact controlled, the company which owned the ship. On
the back of the defendants' consignment note the ship company
was listed as one of the defendants' agents in Europe. The note also
stated that all quotations were made subject to the conditions of the
latest authorized form of the defendants' bill of lading. In dealing
with the plaintiff shipper, the defendants' representative referred
to the ship as "our ship" and "our line." An order bill of lading had
been signed with a stamp by the master and issued to the shipper.
The goods, however, were delivered by the ship company to a buyer
without production of the bill of lading. The shipper brought an
action against the defendants for misdealing. The defendants urged
that they were not liable because they were acting as a forwarding
agent, the bill of lading having been issued by the ship company
and not themselves. After discussing the circumstances under
which the contract was made, including the terms of the consignment note, the court concluded that the defendants were responsible for misdealing because in this case, "the defendants undertook
that responsibility of carrying contractor." 96
letter of credit modified, the buyer stated, "'[w]e trust this arrangement will
facilitate and expedite the handling of these shipments for our account' 102
F. Supp. at 743-44.

93 Id. at 747.
94 Id,

95 6 Lloyd's List L.R. 577 (K.B. 1921).

96 Id. at 579.
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Vessels Under Charter Contract

Under the third type of operation the shipowner solicits offers
to purchase the entire cargo space of a particular vessel for shipping goods. The contract is called a charter contract. In its broad
sense, the word "charter" includes a demise charter discussed in
the first type of business operation. In the modern usage and in
this article, however, the term "charter contract" refers to charters
other than demise charters. A charter contract may be oral 7 or in
writing. In the latter case, the document which contains a charter
contract is called a charter party. A particular vessel is specified
by the charter party, because each vessel has her own peculiarity
as to fitness, loading capacity, speed, etc. and the charterer generally regards such pecularity as a factor in entering into a charter
contract.98
A charter contract is a contract of affreightnent 9 or carriage,
and is distinguishable from a demise charter which is a contract of
hire or lease. Under a demise charter, the absolute possession and
control of the vessel passes to the charterer. On the other hand,
under a charter contract, though the charterer is to supply or
arrange for the cargo to be carried and to give instructions as to
the operation of the vessel, the possession and control of the vessel
remains in the shipowner. 00 In modern shipping, charter contracts
are far more important than demise charters, and when a vessel is
termed "chartered," the presumption is that the contract is a charter contract, rather than a demise charter. 0 1 A charter contract
may be either a time charter or voyage charter. In both cases, the
charterer may either supply his own goods, or supply others' goods
under subcontracts. In the latter case, he is a principal and not
an agent of the shipowner and should not be confused with a freight
broker who is an agent of the shipowner. A charterer who supplies
his own goods to form a complete cargo of the vessel is called a
shipper charterer. 02 A charterer who arranges with other shippers
-non-charterer shippers-to carry their goods is called a nonshipper charterer. 0 3 In cases where the cargo is supplied by noncharterer shippers, either the shipowner or the charterer may issue
97 James v. Brophy, 71 F. 310 (1st Cir. 1895).
98 See W. Poor, Charter Parties and Ocean Bills of Lading 5-6 (4th ed.
1954).

99 See Lamb v. Parkman, 14 F. Cas. 1019 (No. 8020) (D.C.D. Mass. 1859).
100 Id.

-101 Pacific Improvement Co. v. Schubach-Hamilton S.S. Co., 214 F. 854
(W.D. Wash. 1914).
102 An illustration of such arrangement is found in In Te S.S. Co. Norden,
6 F.2d 883 (D. Md. 1925).
103 An illustration of such arrangement is found in The Carib Prince, 170
U.S. 655 (1898).
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bills of lading to shippers. Common practice is also for the shipowner to issue one or more bills of lading to the shipper charterer
for use in connection with a documentary draft for bank collection
or discount.10 4
Carriage under a charter party is also called contract carriage
and courts have uniformly held that chartered vessels and their
owners vis-h-vis the shipper charterer are private carriers.1 0 5 The
0 6 stated: "[b]y the
federal district court, in Lamb v. Parkman,1
charter-party, the whole ship was let to the [charterer], who was to
furnish a full cargo, and the owners had no right to take goods for
any other person. In no sense were they common carriers, but
bailees to transport for hire .... -"107 The courts have not regarded
the shipowner who charters his vessel to a shipper chartered as
exercising a public employment and therefore, under the definitions
of Story, Abinger and Parsons, the shipowners could not be common carriers.
The designation of a vessel operating under a charter party as a
private carrier does not result from the existence of a charter party
nor from the intention of the parties but from the fact that the
vessel carries the cargo supplied by one person, the charterer. This
fact was determinative in Jefferson Chemical Co. v. MIT Grena.10 8
In this case the shipowner had concluded with a shipper a contract
which entitled a tanker voyage charter party or a Warshipoilvoy
form of charter party to carry various chemical products. "The
contract did not specify shipment on a particular vessel or part of
a vessel but rather pledged [the shipowner's] tonnage to [the shipper] on a time demand basis. The contract permitted [the shipper]
to utilize up to the full reach of the vessel, although it was not contemplated that [the shipper] would do so during the term of the
contract." 10 9 The contract contained a general exception clause under which neither the vessel nor the owner was liable for damages
to the cargo not caused by lack of due diligence. Bills of lading were
issued to the shipper pursuant to the contract. The insurer of the
cargo, as subrogee, brought this action to recover from the shipowner for contamination of cargo during the voyages. In rejecting
the contention of the shipowner that he was exonerated under the
general exception clause, the court held that the shipowner acted
104 See E. Farnsworth & J. Honnold, Cases and Materials on Commercial
Law 316 et seq. (2d ed. 1968).
105 The Fri, 154 F. 333 (2d Cir. 1907); Sumner v. Caswell, 20 F. 249
(S.D.N.Y. 1884) ; Lamb v. Parkman, 14 F. Cas. 1019 (No. 8020) (D.C.D. Mass.
1859).
106 14 F. Cas. 1019 (No. 8020) (D.C.D. Mass. 1859).
107 Id. at 1023.
108 413 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1969).
109 Id. at 865 (footnotes omitted).
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as a common carrier, and the clause was void under the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act.1 10 The court considered significant the fact
that although the contract was entitled a charter party, the shipper
did not agree to employ the "entire ship" or the "full capacity of
the ship." The agreement did not specify any particular space upon
a vessel, but rather, left designation of a vessel within the control
of the shipowner. During two voyages the shipper used but ten to
fifteen per cent of the vessel's carrying capacity and on both voyages there were others utilizing the vessel's space for carriage.
Therefore, if a vessel carries goods of many shippers, it is a common carrier despite coverage of part of the cargo by a charter
party.
When the charterer subcharters the vessel to another person, it
is clear that the shipowner and the charterer, whoever is held liable
vis-A-vis the subcharterer, is a private carrier. However, when the
charterer puts up the vessel as a general ship, though the shipowner
was, vis-A-vis the charterer, a private carrier,' the charterer who
issued bills of lading was, vis-A-vis the shippers who had no knowledge of the charter party, a common carrier. 1 2 It was also held
in another case that the shipowner was, vis-A-vis the shippers of
general goods without knowledge of a charter party, a common
carrier, where the master signed bills of lading, even though the
charter party stipulated that the master signed them on behalf of
the charterer. 1 3
D. Lighterage
In the fourth type of operation, called lighterage, a shipowner
solicits others to hire him to carry goods. No specific vessel is designated in the contract. This form of operation occurs most often in
the operation of lighters and barges." 4 The difference between this
type of operation and operation of a vessel as a general ship is that
in the former, the shipowner solicits offers from individuals, while
in the latter he offers to take the goods of all comers. The shipowner may use any one of his vessels to carry the goods, and if
110 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1970). See note 8 supra.
111 Burn Line, Ltd. v. United States & A. S.S. Co., 162 F. 298 (2d Cir.
1908).
112 Benner Line v. Pendleton, 217 F. 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1914). See also Burn
Line v. United States & A. S.S. Co., 162 F. 298 (2d Cir. 1908).
"3 Venezuelan Meat Export Co. v. United States, 12 F. Supp. 379, 388
(D. Md. 1935).
114 There are two types of barges. One has motive power and, in such case,
the barge itself is considered as a vessel. Other barges are without motive
power themselves and have to be towed by tugs. In the latter case, the barge
together with the tug which tows it are considered one vessel. See Sacramento
Navigation Co. v. Salz, 273 U.S. 326 (1927).
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the vessel also carries the goods of other shippers, the vessel is a
general vessel and undoubtedly a common carrier. If a shipowner
uses one of his vessels not specifically designated by the parties to
carry only the goods of one shipper and the shipowner contracts
to do so, not as a profession but on an occasional basis, he is a
private carrier." 5 However, when the shipowner is engaged in contracting in this manner as a profession and the vessel carries the
goods of only one shipper, the characterization of the carrier as a
common carrier or a private carrier becomes difficult. The following discussion will be limited to this situation. While in general
practice, few, if any, lighter-owners issue bills of lading, barge
owners often do so. The cases discussed below are not limited to
instances in which bills of lading are involved.
Aside from the question of being engaged in a public employment, the owner of a lighter plying between the dock and a ship
anchored either within the port or offshore is not a common carrier
under the view of Lord Abinger since the lighter does not carry
goods from town to town or port to port. Nor is the lighter a
common carrier under the definition of Parsons since goods are
not carried between certain termini or on a certain route.
In England, the characterization of a lighter as a common carrier or a private carrier was first raised in Lyon v. Mells. 16 "The
defendant [shipowner] kept sloops for carrying other persons'
goods for hire, and also lighters for the purpose of carrying these
goods to and from his sloops; and when he had not employment
for his lighters for his own business, he let them for hire to such
persons as wanted to carry goods to other sloops." 7 The defendant's lighter which carried plaintiff's yarn leaked and some of the
bales of yarn thereby wetted and damaged. The lighter was found
to be unseaworthy and, therefore, even as a private carrier, the
owner would have been liable for the loss. However, a general notice
had been posted by the defendant which stated:
[W]e will not be answerable for any loss or damage which
shall happen to any cargo which shall be put on board any
of our vessels, unless such loss or damage shall happen or
be occasioned by want of ordinary care and diligence in the
master or crew of the vessel; when and in such case we will
pay 101. per centum upon such loss or damage, so as the
115 Consolidated Tea and Lands Co. v. Oliver's Wharf, [1910] 2 K.B. 395.
But see Moss v. Bettis, 4 Heisk. 661 (Tenn. 1871). (The Supreme Court of
Tennessee held that a boatman who occasionally contracted to carry goods of
another person was a common carrier.) Hutchinson regards Moss v. Bettis
as the exception rather than the rule. R. Hutchinson, The Law of Carriers
§§ 51-53 (1879).
116 102 Eng. Rep. 1134 (K.B. 1804).
117 Id. at 1134.
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whole amount of such payment shall not exceed the value of

the vessel.., and the freight ... "118

Lord Ellenborough held that the defendant shipowner was liable
for his own negligence and not relieved by the notice, because "it
is clear beyond a doubt that the only object of the owners of lighters
was to limit their responsibility in those cases only where the law
would otherwise have made them answer for the neglect of others,
and for accidents which it might not be within the scope of ordinary care and caution to provide against."-"9 This statement clearly
suggests that the defendant would, but for the notice, be responsible
for loss of the goods carried by the lighter occasioned by accidents
which it might not be within the scope of ordinary care and caution to provide against, a liability imposed only on a common carrier. In the mind of Ellenborough the lighter was a common carrier
or at least incurred the liability of a common carrier. The owner
no doubt thought his liability that of a common carrier and thus
had sought to protect himself by the notice. 20
Exactly seventy years later the issue was once again raised in
the case of Liver Alkali Co. v. Johnson,'2 ' under the consideration
of the Exchequer Chamber on an appeal from the Court of Exchequer. As required from time to time the defendant, owner of
several flats, sent out his flats, under the care of his own servants,
to different persons to carry the cargo of that person alone. The
evidence showed that "'he carried for any one who chose to employ him, but that an express agreement was always made as to
each voyage or employment of the defendant's flats'" but not a
specified flat. 22 The Exchequer Chamber interpreted this evidence
to mean that "the flats did not go about plying for hire, but were
waiting for hire by any one.' 23 In other words, the barge owner
was in the business of letting vessels. The Exchequer Chamber
added, "[w]e think that this describes the ordinary employment
of a lighterman."' 24 In this particular case, the plaintiffs, who carried on business at Liverpool, contracted for the defendant's service. The plaintiffs directed that a flat should proceed to a place on
the Mersey a few miles above Liverpool, pick up a cargo of salt
cake, and bring the salt cake to the Liverpool docks. On the return
voyage the flat became grounded on a shoal in a fog. The goods
were lost, but no negligence was found on the part of the ship.18 Id. at 1135.
119 Id. at 1138 (emphasis added).
120 See Nugent v. Smith, 1 C.P.D. 423 (C.A. 1876).
121 L.R. 7 Ex. 267 (1872), af'd, L.R. 9 Ex.338 (1874).
122 LR.9 Ex.338, 340 (1874).

123 Id.
124 Id.

at 340-41.
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owner and his agent. The court was of the view that the fog could
in no sense be called an act of God or of the Queen's enemies, but
was a peril for which a common carrier was responsible. Clearly,
the bargeowner did not operate his flats as general vessels and the
flats did not ply between any fixed termini. The bargeowner did,
however, exercise the trade of a carrier, and, unlike the lighter involved in Lyon v. Me Us, which was let out to carry goods to or from
sloops, the flats were engaged in the conveyance of goods between
ports. In affirming the judgment below, the Exchequer Chamber
carefully avoided repeating the ruling below that "the defendant
was a common carrier."'125 Instead the Chamber held that the shipowner "incur[red] the liability of a common carrier.' ' 26 This holding was, in all probability, influenced by the thought that an essential characteristic of a common carrier is the obligation to carry
the goods of all comers. A carrier, such as the defendant in this
case who was not so obliged, though not strictly speaking a common carrier, may incur the liability of a common carrier. 127 Thus,
the Chamber declared, "we do not think it necessary to inquire
whether the defendant is a carrier so as to be liable to an action
for not taking goods tendered to him."' 28 The Chamber said that
"both on authority and principle, a person who exercises this business and employment [of a bargeowner] does, in the absence of
something to limit his liability, incur the liability of a common
carrier in respect of the goods he carries."' 1 29 The Chamber added,

"certainly it is difficult to see any reason why the liability of a
shipowner who engages to carry the whole lading of his ship for
who carries the
one person should be less than the liability of 1one
80
lading in different parcels for different people.' 1
The Liver Alkali decision was questioned by Judge Cockburn in
Nugent v. Smith.' 3' The court stated:
We are, of course, bound by the decision of the Court of
Exchequer Chamber in the case referred to as that of a
court of appellate jurisdiction, and which, therefore, can
only be reviewed by a court of ultimate appeal; but I cannot help seeing the difficulty which stands in the way of the
ruling in that case, namely, that it is essential to the character of a common carrier that he is bound to carry the
goods of all persons applying to him, while it never has been
held, and, as it seems to me, could not be held, that a perL.R. 7 Ex.267, 269 (1872).
L.R. 9 Ex. 338, 341 (1874).
127 See the argument of Channell, Q.C., for the plaintiff in Hill v. Scott,
[1895] 2 Q.B. 371, 374.
128 Liver Alkali Co. v. Johnson, L.R. 9 Ex. 338, 340 (1874).
129 Ia at 341.
125
126

180

Id.

131 1 C.P.D. 423 (C.A. 1876).
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son who lets out vessels or vehicles to individual customers
on their application was liable to an action for refusing the
use of such vessel or vehicle if required to furnish it. At all
events, it is obvious that the decision of the Court of Exchequer Chamber proceeded on the ground that the defendant in that case was a common carrier... 182
Judge Cockburn appears to ignore the fact that Judge Blackburn in the Alkali case carefully avoided saying that the shipowner
was a common carrier. Blackburn, in fact, created a third class
of carrier who, although not, strictly speaking, a common carrier
so as to be bound to carry goods of all comers, is a quasi-common
carrier and bears the responsibility of a common carrier for loss
or damage to goods contracted to be carried.183 In Nugent, Cockburn also commented on Lyon v. Mells, stating that "Lord Ellenborough no where treats [the bargeowner] as [a common carrier],
but decides the case on a general ground applicable to all carriers,
whether common or private."'134 It is submitted that although Lyon v.
Mells was indeed based upon a general ground applicable to both
common and private carriers, the statement of Ellenborough undisputably was that the bargeowner was regarded as having the
liability of a common carrier. Ellenborough may have been in error
to hold that position, but he did so.
In Hill v. Scott, 85 the defendant owned vessels carrying goods
between London and Goole. He entered into a contract to carry wool
for the plaintiff and the facts indicated that the vessel in fact carried only the plaintiff's wool. 3 6 The cargo was damaged by seawater through no negligence of the shipowner. Holding for the
plaintiff shipper, the court, approving the Alkali case, said that the
shipowner was exercising a public employment and undertook to
carry goods for customers by his steamers in the course of that
employment. The shipowner thereby incurred the liability of a
common carrier. Thus, the ruling of the Alkali case was extended
to steamers carrying the goods of one person between ports. It
should be stressed that in all these cases, the parties did not designate a particular vessel to carry the cargo.
If Lyon v. Mells failed to establish that a lighter which carries
goods between a ship and a dock bears the liability of a common
132 Id. at 433-34 (emphasis added).
183 The problem of these two cases was noted and briefly discussed in
T. Scrutton, Charterparties and Bills of Lading 202-04 (17th ed. 1964).
184 1 C.P.D. 423, 433 (C.A. 1876).
185 [1895] 2 Q.B. 371.
186 The court cited the Liver Alkali case, which involved a vessel carrying
goods of only one shipper. Also, by the time of the present case, the rule was
settled that a general ship is a common carrier, and thus would not have required the courts to discuss the issue so extensively, had it been a general ship.
Id. at 375.
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carrier, Joseph Travers & Sons v. Cooper, 187 settled the question,
though in this case a barge was used in the lighterage operation. The
defendant was a wharfinger and warehouseman. In addition, the
defendant also undertook for reward to supply lighterage services
to his customers. At the head of all the defendant's letters, memoranda, and invoices was printed the following clause: "I will not
be responsible for any damage to goods however caused which can
be covered by insurance."1 18 The plaintiffs instructed the defendant
to collect twelve thousand twenty-one cases of tinned salmon from
a docked steamship, and deliver the cases by lighter to the defendant's wharf. No specific lighter was designated by the parties to
carry the goods. Accordingly, five thousand five hundred eighteen
cases were loaded from the steamship into a barge operated by
the defendant. The barge was taken by the defendant's lighterman
to the wharf and made fast alongside. The barge was to remain
there until the next morning, when it would be moved to make
room for the arrival of a steamer. The lighterman left the barge
unattended and, upon returning, found water flowing over the
barge's cabin roof into the hold, submerging the barge and damaging the cargo. The barge had either been underpinned or mudsucked when the tide fell and rose again during the lighterman's
absence. On an appeal from a judgment for the defendant in an
action brought by the shipper to recover for the damage, a unanimous court of appeals agreed that the defendant bore the liability
of a common carrier, though the individual judges differed as to
his liability on the facts of the case.13 9
It should be noted that in some ports, of which London is an
example, lightermen have formed associations. The association publishes a notice to the public, known as the lighterage clause, which
exempts the member lightermen from liability. The King's Bench
in Armour and Co. v. Charles Tarbard,Ltd.,140 held that the lighterage clause was not only binding upon a shipper as against mem137

[1915] 1 K.B. 73 (C.R. 1914).

138 Id. at 74.
139 Buckley, L.J. stated,
[ijt seems to me unnecessary to consider whether this defendant was

a common carrier. If he has undertaken the liability of a common carrier
he stands in the same position as regards liability. The question whether
he has undertaken such liability or not is ... one of fact. He was a person who did not hold himself out as ready to carry goods for every one,
but he did, I think, hold himself out as a person ready to carry goods for
reward for anyone who resorted to his wharf as a customer of himself
as a wharfinger... According to Liver Alkali Co. v. Johnson such a
person may incur the liability of a common carrier. As a lighterman he
was, I think, a person who incurred the liability of a common carrier in

respect of the goods he carried.
Id. at 83-84.
140 37 T.L.R. 208 (K.B. 1920).
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ber lighternien, but also as against non-member lighterinen who
occasionally exercise such employment.
Under the view of Lord Abinger, a lighter which plies between
a sea-going ship and the dock in the same port is not a common
carrier since the lighter plies within the realm. Neither is such a
lighter a common carrier under the definition of Parsons since
goods are not carried between definite termini or on a definite route.
English courts, however, clearly have not adopted these limitations
advanced by Abinger and Parsons, but appear to regard the business of these lighter-owners analogously to the concept of "public
employment," the only difference being that the owners of the
lighters are not obliged to accept the goods of all comers. These
courts have in effect created a third character of carrier, the quasicommon carrier, upon whom is imposed the liability of common
carrier only as regards goods accepted for carriage.
American courts, in contrast, appear to regard vessels operated
in this manner as private carriers. The Wildenfels,141 was an action
brought by the shipper in a federal district court to recover from
the owner of a lighter, on which the shipper's goods had been carried, for the loss of the cargo during the lighterage voyage from
a sea-going vessel to shore. The action was initially based upon
negligence theory and a motion to amend the libel to allege that
the lighter was a common carrier was denied. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the lower court properly
rejected the motion as untimely. The court remarked:
[w] e are of the opinion that the [lighter] was not, pro hac
vice, a common carrier. It is true that her owner was in the
lighterage business and was in the habit of taking goods for
any one who wanted lighterage done. She had, however, no
regular route, did not carry between well known termini,
and, on the occasion in question was engaged to carry and
had on board only, the jute of the libelant. She was not a
general ship, but was employed for this business exclusively,
no one else had a right to put a pound of freight aboard her.
She became a private carrier and liable only as a bailee for
hire. Her owner was under no legal obligation to carry this
jute, he could have refused this and all other cargoes had
he seen fit to
do so and no liability would have attached to
42
his refusal.
The Wildenfels was subsequently cited for the proposition that a
vessel which carries goods of only one shipper is a private carrier.143 The facts in The Wildenfels do not disclose whether the
161 F. 864 (2d Cir. 1908), cert. denied, 215 U.S. 597 (1909).
Id. at 866.
Continental Ins. Co. v. Anchor Line Ltd., 53 F.2d 1032, 1033 (E.D.N.Y.
1931); The C. R. Sheffer, 249 F. 600, 601 (2d Cir. 1918) [which was in turn
141

142
143
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parties to the contract of carriage specified any particular lighter,
and the court's failure to discuss this indicates it probably did not
think this factor relevant. The Bowling Green4 4 confirmed this
point. In this case the agent of a shipowner in New York had a
long-standing agreement with a lighterage company whereby the
latter agreed to transport all cargoes handled by the shipowner
from the agent's pier to other points in or about New York harbor.
On the arrival of the goods which gave rise to the action, the shipowner's agent notified the lighterage company which sent several
lighters. Among the lighters sent was the Bowling Green. The
goods were loaded and stowed on the Bowling Green, which was
then towed to and made fast alongside the ship which was to transship the goods to the final destination. While so positioned the
Bowling Green was struck by another lighter which was solely at
fault. The goods in question were either lost or damaged. The libel
was brought by the holders of the bills of lading covering the goods
involved. There was no doubt that the Bowling Green sent by the
lighterage company was not designated by either the contract between the shipper and the shipowner or the contract between the
shipowner's agent and the lighterage company. Concluding that the
Bowling Green was a private carrier and therefore not liable for
the loss or damage of the goods, the federal district court cited
The Wildenfels among others and reasoned that:
The only cargo carried by [the lighter companies], and
lighter Bowling Green, at the time in question was that
which was carried under the said agreement between [the
shipowner's agent] and [the lighterage company] on the
order of [the shipowner's agent], and this did not make
them common carriers, but only bailees to transport for hire,
and to recover as against them
1 45 or either of them negligence
must be affirmatively shown.
Thus, the fine distinction made by the English courts has not
been adopted by American courts. The latter disregard the business
operation of the proprietors of lighters or barges and hold vessels
operated under the type of operation to be private carriers because
the vessels carry the goods of one shipper only.
AN APPRAISAL

As Holt indicated, the imposition of strict liability on common
carriers was intended to guard against their fraud. 46 The rationale
cited by The Doyle, 105 F.2d 113, 114 (3d Cir. 1939) and The Wm. I. McIlroy,
37 F.2d 909, 910 (E.D.N.Y. 1930)].
144 11 F. Supp. 109 (E.D.N.Y. 1935), af'd sub nor. Czarnikow Rionda
Co. v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co., 81 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1936).
145 11 F. Supp. 109, 111.
146 See text at note 22 supra.
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seems to be the assumption that while a shipper generally gets to
know a contract carrier and his character before he entrusts goods
to the latter, a shipper may entrust goods to a common carrier who
is a total stranger. If such an assumption was true in earlier days
when population was thin and personal contact between merchants
was possible and frequent, it is no longer true today. Shippers'
knowledge of the character of their contract carriers is as small
as that of the character of their common carriers. Moreover, fraud
on the part of water carriers of the type to be guarded against
by the common law rule rarely exists nowadays. Therefore, it is
doubtful that the difference in liabilities between common carriers
and private carriers remains justified or necessary. Nevertheless,
the statutes have failed to eliminate the difference. Article Seven
of the Uniform Comercial Code clearly points out that the common
law rule which imposes liability upon a common carrier for damages not caused by its negligence is not repealed or changed. 47
The Harter Act has been held to apply only to common carriers.
Although the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (Cogsa) imposes identical liability on both common and private carriers, such is true
only when the Act applies. The Act does not apply to a private
carrier when the private carrier has failed to issue a bill of lading
or when the bill of lading, though issued, remains in the possession of the charterer. 148 Even if the parties to a contract of carriage
stipulate that Cogsa governs throughout the entire time the goods
are in the custody of the carrier, a discrepancy in result between
a common carrier and a private carrier may be created when the
Harter Act comes into play. This point is well illustrated by
Remington Rand, Inc. v. American Export Lines 49 In that case,
several shippers who had delivered goods to a shipowner in New
York for transportation to Bombay, India, sought to recover from
the shipowner for damage to the goods incurred after they were
discharged at Bombay into lighters. Part of the cargo included
drums of film, and after a long exposure to the sun, a fire occurred
while the lighters were moored alongside the ship, resulting in
damage to the cargo. The bills of lading issued by the shipowner
contained a provision which stated that Cogsa "'shall govern before the goods are loaded on and after they are discharged from
the ship and throughout the entire time the goods are in the custody of the carrier.' "150 The court found that the shipowner failed
to exercise the care required under Section 3 (2) of Cogsa.151 The
147 Uniform Commercial Code 7-309(1). See text at note 16 supra.
148 For discussion in detail, see Chiang, supra note 7.
'49 132 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
150 Id. at 137.
151 46 U.S.C. § 1303(2) (1970) provides, "The carrier shall properly and
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shipowner contended that he was nevertheless released from liability under the fire exception of Cogsa 152 which was made applicable
to the time of the fire by the provision in the bill of lading. In rejecting the contention, the court in effect said that the Harter Act
applied after goods were discharged from the ship to the lighters
and the parties could not stipulate that Cogsa be the governing law.
The Harter Act applied, apparently because the shipowner was,
on that occasion, a common carrier. Had the shipowner been a
private carrier, the provision in the bill of lading stipulating that
Cogsa governed would have been upheld, since the Harter Act does
not apply to a private carrier and a private carrier may freely contract that Cogsa applies to the contract of carriage. 153
The existing legislation has not eliminated the unnecessary
characterization. Since the characterization at common law is probably too well entrenched to be abolished by courts, further legislative enactments or amendments imposing identical liability on both
classes of carrier may be the only way to reconcile the law with
reality. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in detail
what the identical liability should be. It was once held that both
private carriers and common carriers were subject to strict liability.154 Legislative enactments, however, have shown a tendency, and
properly so, of rejecting strict liability. 55 In general, the severity
of the liability should be between the liability presently imposed
on a common carrier and that on a private carrier. The liability
imposed in Cogsa and in the civil law system may serve as good
models.
CONCLUSION
It may be concluded that a shipowner who merely demises his
ship is not regarded as a carrier with respect to the operation of
the vessel by the demisee. The demisee, moreover, may be a common carrier or a private carrier if he engages in one of the remaining three forms of modern maritime operation and is, for this
purpose, a "shipowner." The shipowner who engages in operation
of his vessel as a general ship is a common carrier. The shipowner,
carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods
carried."
152 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2) (b) (1970). Section 1304(2) provides in part:
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage
arising or resulting from... (b) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault
or privity of the carrier; (c) Perils, dangers, and accidents of sea or
other navigable waters....

153 See text at note 17 eupra.
154 See note 13 supra.
15 See the Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-95 (1970) and the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1970).
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on the other hand, who engages in contract carriage, contracting
the entire capacity of a specified vessel to one shipper, is a private
carrier. Finally the owner of a vessel engaged in the lighterage
operation, which carries the goods of a single shipper, is a quasicommon carrier in England, but is characterized as a private carrier in the United States. The term quasi-common carrier refers to
a carrier who bears the liability of a common carrier solely with
respect to the risk of damage to accepted cargoes and bears no
liability for refusal to carry proffered goods. The common law
distinction is probably no longer justified or necessary, and should
be legislatively abolished.

